Executive Summary

Less than two weeks before the so-called Grand Debate—the Accra Summit of Heads of State and Government of the African Union (AU) in Ghana—TrustAfrica organized a historic gathering of its own in Marrakech, Morocco, bringing together a diverse set of organizations and individuals, including scholars, civil society leaders, and development practitioners. The workshop sparked a lively debate over whether it was appropriate, in the face of many other pressing regional issues, to be discussing the cost of non-integration in Africa. In line with other recent meetings organized by civil society organizations (CSOs) across the continent, the TrustAfrica workshop concluded that continental processes intended to achieve regional integration and Union Government should be consultative and people-driven; and that free movement and African citizenship are essential in attaining a united Africa. Among many conclusions drawn during three days of discussion, a general consensus emerged on these issues:

i. Privileging the past often closes off avenues for forward thinking. In most discussions of regional integration, especially those leading to the Accra Summit, there is a tendency to hold on to sacred cows—to insist doing things in ways that are not necessarily relevant in the present context.

ii. The state has a central role to play in integration processes. Participants observed that weak or poorly governed states hinder the objectives of integration.

---

1 This report was written soon after the Accra Summit (July 1–3, 2007), the concurrent Executive Council of Foreign Ministers, and a number of related civil society meetings, such as Towards An Africa Without Borders Conference (July 5–9, 2007; Durban), where TrustAfrica sponsored a panel (moderated by Dr. Bhekinkosi Moyo) and two panelists (Dr. Omamo Edigheji and Dr. Eddy Maloka) to discuss ‘Pan-Africanism in Practice.’

2 About 11 public debates in seven countries were held between May 25 and June 18, 2007. At least four of them included participation by policy makers, with the Senegalese Foreign Minister attending the RADDHO-Oxfam meeting; African ambassadors in Senegal attending the TrustAfrica-African Ambassadors meeting; government officials attending the meeting in Nairobi organized by Oxfam, ActionAid, SOAWR, and others; and government ministers attending the AU Ghana Civil Society Coalition meeting at Kumasi.
iii. Integration should take root first within member states. An integrationist mindset must be encouraged within countries to build a bottom-up (people-centered) and state-led integration process. Integration should be made as widely accessible as possible to ensure that citizens understand the issues at stake and engage with it.

iv. There is a wide gap between state-led integration and integration led and owned by the people. This lacuna needs to be addressed in ways that will connect states to the people. Concern was expressed that at the sub-regional and continental levels, (state-led) integration proceeded at a snail’s pace despite the proliferation of norms and standards. Yet integration between and among people across sub-regions and the continent has been under way from time immemorial. In effect, there are two distinct and parallel forms of integration: informal integration, which has long been a reality, and formal integration, which has lagged behind and in some cases stifled the impulse of African peoples to migrate and trade among themselves. The question therefore arises whether the people have left the states behind.

v. For integration to succeed, it must recognize and acknowledge the existence and relevance of multiple indigenous associational forms that have endured despite the predominance of external forces.

vi. Africa’s territorial integrity cannot be disputed. Yet tensions between incrementalist, gradualist, and totalizing views on integration need to be problematized.

vii. Diversity is critical to the success of integration in Africa, and research projects should be established to measure the costs and benefits of diversity within the context of regional integration.

Specific conclusions were also drawn on the political costs of non-integration in Africa. These included the following:

i. In the political economy of power relations, integration is a potential bulwark against external domination of Africa’s development. However, it cannot be assumed that integration will be guided by ‘genuine and commonly subscribed-to’ values. There is a serious need to unpack the assumptions that form the basis for integration. As was consistently argued during the workshop, some countries and leaders seek integration not for the development of the continent but for their own personal interests. And because some member states do not see integration as overwhelmingly positive, integration may incur costs if it is not managed properly.

ii. Although integration can be conducted from a political point of view, it is important that it be seen in Africa as a holistic phenomenon, encompassing the sociocultural, political, and economic spheres. Integration is not always even or linear; it is marked by reversals, decomposition, and recomposition. It is also a never-ending process, an ideal that will never attain full integration.

iii. Politically, the problem with the absence of timetables in the integration agenda has not been so much of non-integration as of wrongful integration. Whether integration has been pursued as gradual, incremental, or open regionalism, these are questions that need more unpacking.

iv. The ideology of the nation-state, combined with lack of political will, has often worked against regional integration. Nation-statism has also fed ideas of nativism and indigeneity as bases for definition of rights and entitlements, leading to expulsions, extremism, xenophobia, and the fragmentation of Pan-Africanism, citizenship, and identity. Intimately linked to this is the notion of free movement of peoples across the
continent as a prerequisite for successful integration. About 90 percent of migration by Africans is within Africa, and yet migration is still constrained by a mindset that portrays citizens as economic agents rather than people. In this context, it is important to give significance to human capital in advancing integration. Because youth, for example, make up a large proportion of Africa’s population, labor market strategies should be developed taking this into account.

v. It is Africa’s people, and not states or governments, who pay the price of non-integration or bad integration. An elite consensus on the need for a social contract around the integration agenda should therefore be developed.

vi. Africa’s political space has been hijacked by external actors, and its institutions remain highly vulnerable. Furthermore, current arrangements between African leaders and former colonial powers conspire to inhibit integration, while segments of Africa’s elites as well as civil society are partly to blame for the slow pace of integration. It would therefore be useful to strengthen African non-state actors and institutions such as parliaments. Regional processes should be more people-driven. The emergence of good practices in the human rights and legislative arena—as with the African Court, the Pan-African Parliament, and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Court—illustrates the significance of strengthening civil society and other people-based formations.

On economic costs, the following findings emerged:

i. Two broad approaches to economic integration are pursued in Africa today. One, which traces its roots to the Organization of African Union (OAU) and is favored by the AU, focuses on economic development but at the same time centers on people. The other approach, an externally imposed model known as open regionalism, regards the continent as an expanded market populated by economic agents. While the first model treats integration as a means to the ultimate end of welfare and development, the second model views welfare and development as residual outcomes of economic activities. Free movement of people, which is integral to the OAU-AU model, is constrained in the market-based model, in which people’s movement is based on their ability to add market value. Free movement, although an important component of developmental integration, runs the risk of creating enclaves of human capacity, both in countries with larger markets and within smaller countries. As a consequence, smaller and less economically viable countries will lose out.

ii. Today, open regionalism is dominant and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) function as Africa’s key interlocutors with the global trading system. At least 40 percent of integration efforts are externally funded, undermining African ownership. A dichotomy exists between the proliferation of abstract norms and standards at the continental level mandating economic integration (AEC, Abuja Treaty, Union Government proposal, etc.) and the more concrete advances at the sub-regional level mediated by the RECs (like the free trade zone established by the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa). The current model of regional integration is not much different from the structural adjustment programs of the late 1980s, as seen in the ongoing negotiations between RECs and the European Union (EU) over Economic Partnership Agreements, which are roundly criticized for narrowing the policy space for African countries.

iii. A third and perhaps much more advanced type of economic integration is informal, involving cross-border interaction and transactions between people. This informal
exchange of goods, services, and sociocultural relations transcends formal arrangements at national, sub-regional, and continental levels.

iv. Although economic integration does bring benefits, there is insufficient and inadequate empirical evidence to weigh its benefits and costs. As a result, some African countries remain fearful of integration’s impact on their economies. And because many countries no longer pursue industrial policies, they suffer from weak manufacturing capacity and are effectively condemned to export-oriented trade in raw materials. Again, there is a need for in-depth research to examine the importance of industrial policy in Africa and its implications for integration.

v. Economic integration requires substantial resources, and it is critical to develop public-private partnerships to finance and implement regional integration projects.

With regard to sociocultural costs, an area that tends to be ignored in most discussions of integration, participants observed that:

i. One of the enduring sacred cows holds that there is a single defining culture in Africa. Yet Africa is home to many different cultures, in every sense of the word. Inherently social, political, and economic, they play a political role and can be harnessed to fight violence, xenophobia, and other social ills. African heritages therefore need to be promoted and protected to help revitalize and reposition African cultures.

ii. Unless integration takes into account the sociocultural dimensions it runs the risk of falling short of the mark. Attention therefore needs to be paid to the social content of integration. Diversity and its acceptance should be used assets in integration. This should form an agenda for politicians, economic agents, and researchers alike.

iii. Language is also an important asset for Africans. The continued predominance of colonial languages carries a major sociocultural cost for integration, and Africans should learn their own languages. Also important are the African print media, electronic media, and publishing industries, which constitute an important tool in advancing the sociocultural dimension of integration. These can be used in preserving Africa’s cultural memory and telling her own story.

iv. Existing national and transnational laws and standards should be harmonized to protect Africa’s intellectual property and biodiversity. Africa’s creative industries should also be promoted and developed. This means harnessing traditional approaches to mediation as a means of building a culture of peace (as with the West Africa Museum Project).

v. Integration should be sensitive to the unique needs of women, who make up 50 percent of Africa’s population. Youth, the elderly, and marginalized communities should also be taken into account in the design and pursuance of integration.

**Recommendations**

The recommendations that emerged from the workshop fall into three clusters: research; partnership and collaboration; and advocacy and communication.

A number of proposals called for research on:

(a) Africa’s diversity as an asset for integration;
(b) The history and current status of free movement in Africa, particularly the history of the visa;
(c) Informal integration in Africa, including the gender dimension of informal cross-border trade;
(d) Continental and sub-regional norms and standards and the status of their implementation and compliance;
(e) Quantifying the political, economic, and socioeconomic costs and benefits of integration;
(f) The nature of citizenship and the state in the wider integration context;
(g) The feasibility of implementing a pan-African language policy;
(h) A cultural audit of Africa’s heritage and harmonization of laws;
(i) African civil society, the private sector, and the state;
(j) The construction of the nation-state in Africa; and
(k) The implications of South African capital on the integration agenda.

With regard to partnership and collaboration, workshop participants recommended:

(a) Setting up an independent process of dialogue among RECs;
(b) Strengthening public-private partnerships;
(c) Developing electronic tools and mechanisms for enhanced knowledge sharing on integration;
(d) Strengthening pan-African non-state actors;
(e) Strengthening parliaments at the national, sub-regional, and continental levels;
(f) Creating and strengthening fora to promote networking and knowledge sharing among non-state actors in Africa;
(g) Harnessing existing mechanisms, such as the courses on regional integration offered by the Institute for Economic Development and Planning;
(h) Interrogating the culture and governance of regional bodies; and
(i) Adding value to existing efforts, innovating around issues not being addressed, and encouraging collaboration.

And on advocacy and communication, participants recommended taking action to:

(a) Support the development of pan-African and sub-regional TV, radio, and other media;
(b) Establish a pan-African arts council to help strengthen the creative sector;
(c) Ensure citizen participation and dialogue around integration projects and initiatives;
(d) Harness academic institutions and think tanks to strengthen the empirical basis for advocacy;
(e) Develop a Club de Dakar-type forum to think through African integration issues on an ongoing basis; and
(f) Organize a referendum or plebiscite on the proposal for a Union Government or United States of Africa, as a basis for enhanced citizen participation in integration.

Introduction

At the beginning of 2007, TrustAfrica’s board of trustees decided that a workshop should be convened on the cost of non-integration in Africa3. At nearly the same time, the Heads of State

---

3 Some days after the Accra Summit, TrustAfrica supported and took part in a panel on ‘Pan-Africanism in Practice’ at the Towards an Africa without Borders conference in Durban (July 6–8, 2007). The panel reviewed decisions reached at the Accra Summit from an historical perspective. Dr. Eddy Maloka analyzed the Union Government study and described factors that inhibited its success. As part of the technical team that drafted the study, he provided insights on the dynamics involved in forming a United States of Africa. Dr. Omosho Edigeje spoke in detail about regionalization within the context of globalization.
and Government met in Addis Ababa for the 8th Ordinary Session of the AU; they resolved that at the 9th Session in Accra, they would focus on a Union Government study that should originally have been considered at the 7th Summit in Banjul. The ‘Grand Debate,’ as it came to be known, only gained momentum as the Summit neared. Its historical roots, however, are located in the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and identified particularly with figures such as President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana. It is this historical grounding that paints African integration as pan-Africanist. Founding documents of the OAU and the AU—notably the OAU Charter and the Constitutive Act of the AU—emphasize political integration as a priority at the continental level. However, at the sub-regional level, instruments such as the Abuja Treaty (1991) establishing the African Economic Community, the Lagos Plan of Action, and most recently the New Partnership for Africa’s Development emphasize the economic dimension of integration.

Since African independence, there have been three high-water marks in African integration. The first was the establishment of the OAU by independent African states in 1963. The second was the establishment of sub-regional integration institutions from the late 1960s onward (including the first East African Community in 1967 and the Economic Community of West African States in 1975). The third high point, which is ongoing, started with the transformation of the OAU into the African Union in 2002. But there has been serious backtracking along the way. The original East Africa Community was disbanded following the Tanzania-Uganda war of 1978–79, the Maghreb Union remains nonfunctional, and the OAU was at the verge of collapse when it was transformed into the AU. While some of these challenges still abound, there has been some progress, especially among such RECs as the Economic Community of West African States, the Southern African Development Community, and the East African Community. Even the AU has moved swiftly toward a discussion on the possibility of a Union Government. At the just-concluded Accra Summit, heads of State and Government agreed:

- To accelerate the economic and political integration of the African continent, including the formation of a Union Government for Africa, which would finally create the United States of Africa;
- To rationalize and strengthen RECs as well as to harmonize their activities; and
- To involve the African peoples, including Africans in the Diaspora, in the processes leading to the formation of the Union Government.5

It was against this background that the Marrakech workshop took place. There was widespread acceptance that most of integration efforts have been state-led, with very little participation of African peoples and civil society groups. Many other meetings prior to the Grand Debate in Accra also emphasized the consultative aspect of integration.6 The fact that most people do not understand the implications of integration or non-integration made this gathering timely and relevant in that it sought to unpack the benefits of integration and costs of non-integration.

Prior to the workshop, participants and others who did not attend were asked to reflect, through an electronic forum, on questions such as:

---

4 See Decision Assembly/AU/Dec.156 (VIII).


6 These included the Meeting of the African Union Ministers of Foreign Affairs/External Relations (May 8–9, 2007/Zimbabwe), the Pan-African Parliament Session (May 2007), and the various civil society meetings that took place across the continent, including the AU-CSO Pre-Summit Forum in Accra (June 19–21, 2007).
• What are the economic, political, and sociocultural costs of non-integration?
• How are ordinary people affected by non-integration?
• How does non-integration affect Africa’s position in global relations?
• What explains successes and failures of different regional efforts?
• How can costs of non-integration be assessed?

These and many other areas of discussion formed the basis for the workshop. What follows is a report of the deliberations over a three-day period.

Holding Horses\(^7\)

Mr. Fouad Abdelmoumi, a Moroccan citizen and TrustAfrica board member, welcomed participants to Morocco and to the workshop. He noted the historic nature of the convening as well as the significance of the venue. Prior to the workshop, some had questioned the decision to hold it in Marrakech—given that Morocco has opted out of the AU—and proposed moving it to Accra, in line with the AU Summit and other civil society meetings.

The opening session elicited a number of thoughts on the need for integration to be relevant, people-centered, and holistic. Particularly moving were Gerry Salole’s stories, which underlined the importance of maintaining the institution of storytelling. The main theme of the session was ‘Holding Horses,’ or ‘holding on to sacred cows,’ which describes the tendency to remain in the past and fail to move forward. ‘Holding Horses’ is a story about two men who prevent their horses from bolting toward artillery even though in the modern world there are no horses to hold. Similarly, airline cabin crews are now outdone by new technology, for example, in explaining safety rules. These examples touched at the heart of how integration affected Africa’s people. The warning was that in talking about integration, people tend to hold the horses too much—grasping at things that did not work in the past without really thinking about what could work in the future.

The other story that resonated well with the theme under discussion centered on the lives of Ethiopian pastoralists and a team of anthropologists who helped them ‘film’ themselves. In the film, a chief is said to have spent most of the time during the filming process unimpressed by anything—until one day, passing a dairy farm on his way home, he became fascinated by a cow that produced 18 liters of milk. This was the only thing in the whole process that was relevant to him. In other words, integration can be grandiose and still not be relevant to the people. Only when it is relevant will they find it meaningful.

Of equal importance is the need to recognize the existence of institutions that have kept themselves alive despite a multitude of forces—such as indigenous associations, traditional philanthropy, and rotating clubs. In other words, integration should fuse the old and the new.

Participants were urged to reflect on three foundational questions:

• Who were they and why were they attending the workshop?
• What are principles of African integration?
• What did the workshop hope to achieve, and what were the expectations?

\(^7\) This was Gerry Salole’s presentation title, which largely captured the mood of the conference. Dr. Salole argued that in discussions of regional integration there is a tendency to focus excessively on the past at the expense of the future, thereby killing any potential for creative ideas.
Akwasi Aidoo, TrustAfrica’s Executive Director, noted that in organizing the workshop, an effort was made to ensure diversity across the board in selecting participants. He emphasized that TrustAfrica was looking for something new, although African integration itself is not a new thing. He added that, as a new organization in Africa, TrustAfrica tries to find new ways of doing things in Africa, of addressing some of Africa’s most intractable problems. TrustAfrica sees itself as a facilitator, an organization that can bring people together to help determine its program agenda. Hence, in preparing for the workshop, TrustAfrica believed that one new way to make a case for African integration was to look at the cost of non-integration. Although a lot of work has been done on the premise that continental integration is good, there has been no attempt to disaggregate or tease out the costs of non-integration, especially at the country level. And for integration to make sense, there is a need for compelling empirical evidence on the costs of non-integration.

Principles guiding the workshop included:

- Integration should be full, holistic, and not partial (the territorial integrity of Africa is not negotiable);
- Integration should be people-centered;
- Integration should be organic, not imitative; it should not be imposed from the outside or defined too narrowly based on Western agendas;
- Integration should be evidence-based; and
- Preservation of diversity is important for integration to succeed.

Some of TrustAfrica’s expectations from the workshop included:

- Finding ways to link research with advocacy, activism, and policy change;
- Defining mechanisms of collaboration and concerted action; and
- Establishing channels for disseminating messages.

The following points emerged during the discussions:

i. The current debate on integration that has been framed within the Union Government proposal leading to a United States of Africa is an ambitious project. The proposal is statist and ignores Africa’s peoples, who are a missing link in the integration agenda. For integration to succeed, it must be grounded on regional blocks and consult widely with the people.

ii. Integration should have a long-term vision and avoid the tendency to be bogged down by the past—what one participant referred to as “lots of motion without movement.” Another emphasized that “the old is dead and the new needs to be born.”

iii. Integration should be implemented holistically and discussed in ways that address all of its facets: economic, social, political, cultural, legal, etc. The gap between state-led integration and integration by ordinary people should be bridged.

iv. There is a need to keep predators out by building global alliances for Africa and linking with the Diaspora.

**Political Costs of Non-Integration**

The session on the political costs of non-integration looked specifically at political integration. It noted that integration is a much-debated theme, but one that is often sidelined in practice. Participants emphasized that political integration should not be isolated from other forms of integration because political costs are organically interconnected to economic, social, and cultural costs. These reinforce each other and impact on each other. And consequences arising from political failure have an impact on economic integration.
The point was also made that for integration to be successful, it should be grounded in the social and political vision or ideal; hence the importance of distinguishing between the ideals that underpin pan-Africanism and the practice of pan-Africanism. As a social project, pan-Africanism is impeccable and should not be in contention. And yet in practice, the problem might not be so much one of non-integration as of wrongful integration. Wrongful integration has manifested itself in mutually reinforcing levels. Integration into the global market has tended to copy and imitate others, failing to address the reality of the continent. As a process, integration is organic to human society—the history of human experience has been one of incremental integration. But Africa has also been exposed to the unevenness of the integration logic: not always linear; marked by reversals, decomposition, and re-composition, suggesting that the process is permanent and that integration will always remain an ideal. Wrongful integration of Africa in the global system has been achieved in many ways. One of the costs has been the highly problematic image of Africa, the idea of Africa as a problem, a sore on the world’s conscience. This has preoccupied generations with the African personality.

The historical pessimism about Africa and the discontent it has provoked played key roles in the founding of pan-Africanism. Ideas were robust, but its practice at independence was based on a failure to yield a pan-territorial notion of citizenship. Instead, a fragmentation happened. It might therefore be useful within the context of the integration debate to commission a study of the history of the visa. Anecdotal information on its impact shows that Morocco is not, for example, different from Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, and other countries.

Notions of nation-statism have also led to political processes, such as nativism, that have manifested themselves through xenophobia, extremism, and genocide. In other words, does it matter to the ordinary person which national territorial identity they hold? In most cases, it depends on when it matters and when it is deployed. In the struggle for pan-Africanism, for example, it has been deployed more in the restrictive sense than in the diverse sense. As a result, the fragmented state of pan-Africanism has led to divisions and democratic deficits.

The state in Africa is the most vulnerable system in the world—vulnerable to external shocks and policy experiments. One key issue to address in renewed attempts at integration is the problematic of the state in Africa. “If we don’t get the state functioning, we won’t get it right,” said Adebayo Olukoshi. But this is not to argue for a statist ideology. The integration process must carry people along. Historically, people have been crossing borders despite barriers (as in Cote D’Ivoire, Ghana, and elsewhere). This is contrary to restrictive formal integration processes.

The effects of non-integration are strongly felt at the national level. Integration should be prioritized at the national level before it can be implemented at the regional and continental levels. Governance issues play an important role in integration, for example, matters relating to weak constitutions that are easily manipulated. Fear of losing sovereignty also gives rise to restrictions on free movement. Another challenge at the national level is the normalization of adherence to international protocols and treaties; African countries rush to sign up but fail to follow up or take stock. Most countries do not think integration will benefit them; in fact, most think they will lose more than they gain. Empirical evidence as to the benefits and costs of integration is therefore of critical importance.

The question to be addressed is whether integration is an end in itself or a means to an end. Current forces (such as many languages, multiple memberships of countries in RECs, diversity, etc.) make it hard to imagine integration. In addition, do external forces allow Africa to pursue
its own agenda? Can the globalization track and the regional integration track be run at the same time? Are African leaders ready to integrate? These are important questions.

With regard to regional public goods and 'bads' (such as HIV/AIDS), integration appears to work. Furthermore, in the human rights arena, international courts are effective while regional parliaments are emerging as important institutions for integration processes. Yet these and many other perceived benefits to integration require a sound base of evidence. And for the benefits to be realized, a gradualist approach to integration is most likely to work (as African leaders meeting in Accra ultimately recognized in relation to the idea of Union Government and a United States of Africa).

Key points made during the plenary discussion are summarized as follows:

i. The nature of the state is such that it is fundamentally weak, but the scope of integration is too ambitious. In this context, it is important to address the type of regionalism that Africa wants. Is it open regionalism or ‘developmental’ regionalism? It seems that both are contemplated in Africa and both demand that the state play a role. The Southern Africa Development Community, for example, has adhered to a developmental agenda in some successful ways; but is the idea of Union Government the right tool for integration?

ii. The pace at which integration takes place needs rigorous analysis. At the continental level, citizens are integrating gradually; at the governmental level, integration is incremental. It would be useful for middle ground to be reached and for the two approaches to merge.

iii. Is integration itself not a political risk? Is the current configuration not imposed and therefore likely not to last longer? One participant cited a study of ECOWAS showing that member states oppose integration. What are the implications of this on the integration agenda?

iv. Political costs and socioeconomic costs are closely linked. For example, in some regions, although three individuals might speak the same local language, they might need interpretation to understand each other’s colonial languages.

v. There is also a strong link between non-integration and military/security issues. When countries are not well integrated, it is easy for them to be captured by military/security arrangements, which are much more insidious. The result is that ordinary people pay the price. In addition, most integration has been due to violence, as one powerful state defeats and absorbs another. This should be an area of research moving forward.

vi. In addition to the role of the state in the integration agenda, there is a need to strengthen the role of non-state actors (including in parliaments, especially the Pan African Parliament) and build on the AU’s effort to involve non-state actors in its initiatives.

vii. Political will is critical for the integration agenda to succeed, and remains a missing link. The narrow interests of leaders influence the extent to which they commit to, and their seriousness in relation to, integrationist initiatives. In some quarters, ordinary people see integration, such as migration, as a threat. This raises the question of how integration can be communicated so that it benefits ordinary people while also being bolstered by strong political will at the highest levels.

viii. A number of achievements have been registered in the integration process, with the ECOWAS protocol on free movement of peoples being a prime example. But despite being in existence on paper since 1978, unbridled free movement does not happen in practice. This is manifested by the belief among many that it is easier to travel outside
Africa than within the continent. Establishing the benefits of free movement in West Africa therefore constitutes an important task.

ix. The notion of nation-statism and citizenship has become untenable in Africa. It would be interesting to study, for example, what the Great Lakes notion of citizenship is.

x. Elite consensus and the social contract should be viewed as flipsides: if there is no elite consensus around a vision and direction for a people, then there necessarily cannot be a social contract.

Working Groups

To advance the discussion on political costs, participants split into small working groups to reflect on the following five questions:

- What is political integration, what integration and for whom?
- Who should drive integration?
- What are the key costs of non-integration?
- How can African citizens participate in integration?
- What lessons have been learned from Africa’s integration?

What is political integration? What integration and for whom?

Participants noted that the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights was so named precisely to emphasize the primacy of people to the integration process. And yet the top-down, non-consultative nature of integration efforts to date is inimical to the participation of Africa’s peoples. The workshop concluded that there was little point in putting in place institutional mechanisms for integration without addressing fundamental questions of representation and participation. Participants noted with sadness that regional integration processes have tended to ignore the fact that Africans have needs and interests.

The workshop also underscored the need to differentiate integration from cooperation. In a few areas there is deep integration between countries. Yet states tend to cooperate only when they have common interests, and this is something less than integration. However defined, political integration involves ceding sovereignty to a higher pan-African entity. This could involve devolving the management of issues such as health, education, and welfare—ordinarily the province of national governments—to supranational bodies.

Most states remain unwilling to do so, and this is unlikely to change in the near future. Given this reality, some participants argued that it does not make sense to talk about political integration. According to this view, political integration should and could come at the far end, and other processes must take place first. Practically, the African Union should set an agenda first. History offers a number of lessons. One participant pointed out that when Charles de Gaulle saluted Konrad Adenauer, he was ahead of his citizens and took a political stance—this was the first step toward a political union. What is lacking in Africa is political vision. Other participants argued that it was important that we look at fundamental concerns such as education and HIV/AIDS before we move to grand ideas about political union. The way Arab and African affiliates of Transparency International have invoked the United Nations Convention Against Corruption and the need to harmonize national laws is one example of how, on the basis of specific burning issues, we can find ways to ask our states to address them.

An important point highlighted at the workshop was the fact that the integration under discussion throughout Africa is in reality about re-integration. It was agreed that the current state is an heir of the colonial state, and that it is necessary to look at rebuilding the common space that existed before colonialism. Historians have had difficulties in grappling with this pre-
colonial integration of Africa. The great empires that existed before colonialism allowed free movement of people, while today visas are needed to travel from one country to another. In pre-colonial times, different peoples lived in harmony with each other. One participant argued that the “fear of the map” must be taken away because when problems arise, the tendency is to scapegoat the neighboring country.

The situations where ethnic groups straddle borders must be transformed into a positive element rather than seen as a threat. Research on the fear that comes from the presence of the other would advance this cause. That which integrates us most tends to be viewed as a threat. The challenge, therefore, is to develop common political values based on citizenship, democracy and accountability. Above all, there should be common decision-making structures. The contradiction between the political discourse on integration and its actual implantation at the popular level needs to be addressed, so that states behave in a manner consistent with their rhetoric. There should be a clear, legally binding definition of the term “integration.”

Who drives integration?
There was widespread agreement on the need for a movement toward integration from below and above, at both the popular and the government level. Governments were urged to facilitate cross-border trade and other informal approaches in order to enable integration. It was also emphasized that both citizens and states need to play a role for integration to succeed. In the final analysis, political leaders need to get up to speed with integration, as they currently lag far behind the citizens they nominally lead. An example of this bottom-up integration is the payment of customs duties by the very well-organized informal sector in Senegal. These traders understand integration best and they are living with it already. The state should help them regularize their activities. Free movement of people is important in this regard.

Political costs of non-integration
Building on discussions in the plenary session on political costs, participants argued that economic calculations could be used to measure political costs of non-integration. For instance, statisticians can use price differentials that are paid out as well as transport costs to estimate costs of not integrating with nearby states. Costs also include the high transaction cost of conflict and insecurity.

Participation of African citizens in integration
Participants agreed that the use of media and information communication technologies was critical, especially in targeting women, youth, and rural people to demystify the idea of integration and initiate a debate on fears and concerns around such issues as immigration. Developing a mechanism to get to the right answers concerning integration should be a priority, and this implies adding a cultural dimension to integration. Workshop participants argued that cultural integration was just as important as economic and political integration. Indeed, most of those attending the workshop argued that cultures constitute a critical pillar for integration. Africa should therefore move to establish more pan-African cultural institutions—such as continental radio and television—and a continent-wide language policy.

The overall consensus was that integration should be people-centered, and that governments should involve the public through parliaments, nongovernmental organizations, civil society, and other popular formations. At the same time, there should be periodic consultation to get feedback.

A number of lessons emerged from the discussion, including recognition that:
i. Africa’s RECs are not talking to each other and some countries are members of more than one grouping. This leads to a great deal of duplication. RECs must be rationalized and integrated to avoid duplication.

ii. The Pan African Parliament is not as effective as it should be, in part because its members are nominated rather than elected. It is important for its parliamentarians to be elected by Africans at large, which would energize the imagination of the people and encourage them to take integration seriously.

iii. There should be a balance between realism and idealism.

iv. The state must be sensitized to people’s cross-border needs.

v. Pan-African non-state actors, associations, and actors should be strengthened.

vi. Each country should conduct a cost-benefit analysis of integration. The study would include methods of integration and ask questions about what works, what does not, and why.

Economic Costs of Non-Integration

The session on economic costs of non-integration argued that the economic dimension is at the center of the whole integration project. It also concluded that the fragmentation of the continent stems partly from the size of the economies, the artificial borders that have been drawn, and the fact that most countries’ economies (or at least 40 percent of their GDP) are externally driven. Consequently, landlocked countries face difficulties, and yet the path to integration has not been defined.

Workshop participants also observed that in economic integration people are defined as an economic category and not as citizens. The current AU model, based on the Abuja Treaty, does provide for comprehensive integration that includes informal cross-border economy. But regionalism urges regions to compete effectively on the global stage, often overlooking social and human elements. Hence what we have is increasingly a top-down package. Open regionalism, or the open-market model, gives private or foreign actors power to control regional integration. Open regionalism is heavily influenced by the EU. Africans are discovering that what used to take many years to integrate is now integrated in months. Each individual country is put under pressure to sign agreements with the EU. Because of EU pressure on the Southern African Development Community and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, for example, a third regional bloc—the East and Southern Africa bloc—has now emerged mainly to deal with the EU. What we have now is a vision driven by regional markets, different from what the OAU and AU envisioned.

Competing institutions and ideologies drive these different modes of integration in Africa. The OAU-AU mode of integration, rooted in pan-Africanism is about building Africa as a single economic entity in a total developmental sense—creating conditions for human development, not just markets. But the market integration model emphasizes the free movement of goods and capital, not people. The original European Commission model provides for the free movement of goods, people, and services—but people are defined not as people but as an economic category and only allowed to move if they have economic value.

It is important to distinguish between the two prevalent models in Africa and understand their implications on citizen participation. The AU model, which also gave birth to the RECs and elements of the Abuja Treaty, accords RECs the role of socioeconomic integration—building infrastructure, energy, common policies, etc. This model is open to informal integration—through migration, cross-border trade, etc.—but it needs to put in place better mechanisms, institutions, and rules to make RECs more efficient and to give them more
predictable frameworks. For example, even though ECOWAS provides for free movement of people, corrupt state institutions (both formal and informal) render this movement far from free. The price of crossing these privately defined borders forces many travelers to take difficult and more risky routes to avoid the transaction cost.

Today's dominant model—market-based open regionalism—argues that the challenge of African development is to be more competitive in the global market. It takes Africa's resource endowment for granted and prescribes scaling up efforts to build a regional market that would create economies of scale for the free movement of goods, services, and people. If there is a developmental outcome, it is incidental. Although there may be schemes to help companies train staff, the real interest is not in building human capacity across the board; the interest is in building stock markets.

Africa's RECs, created as development blocs, are increasingly being driven by market approaches, as evidenced by the Economic Partnership Agreements being negotiated with the EU. These agreements treat RECs as a proxy for their member countries and unless otherwise advised the RECs are likely to sign away national rights to the EU in perpetuity. The EU's objective in pushing these agreements, spurred by growing competition with the United States and Japan, is to guarantee market space for European goods and services in Africa's sub-regions and by extension its countries.

Africa would appear to have failed to learn lessons from its recent history of integration. The failure of industrialization in the 1970s was largely due to weak financial markets, which imposed huge costs on Africa's people. This led in the 1980s to efforts to open markets in lieu of the original strategy of strengthening domestic markets. Today, the main objective of economic activities should be to raise living standards of populations. Regional integration opens new trade opportunities, larger markets, enhanced competition, and economic growth. If managed properly, and in Africa's interest, integration should ideally lead to development. It is important that it takes into consideration social justice and other related matters in its quest for market power and bargaining power for African countries.

Participants noted that the literature shows that countries that do not trade with each other often fail to integrate. Thus it is desirable that integration be conducted by countries that trade with each other, as they should be at similar levels of development but with different and complimentary resource bases.

The financing of integration was raised as an issue of critical importance. In Europe, the cost of building integration infrastructure came from the private sector. Can the same be replicated in Africa? For this to happen, governments will have to create necessary conditions for the private sector to thrive.

The plenary discussion on economic costs raised the following key points.

i. Market-led integration and development-led integration are not necessarily mutually exclusive; they can reinforce each other. But there are conditions that must be in place for both to flourish, including similar levels of industrial development, harmonized macro policies, regional macro and political stability, significant intra-regional trade, endowments, and the political will to cede a degree of sovereignty. The only fundamental difference between them is the role that the state assumes. Markets must be governed if regional integration is to advance social justice.
ii. A subset of workshop participants preferred to talk of regional cooperation rather than integration. This cooperation could only happen within sub-regions, where there are similarities in factors such as production and proximity to facilitate movement of goods. This could later be translated into continental cooperation.

iii. Integration should make sense for ordinary citizens. Integration should convert Africa’s natural resources and human capital for the common good of the people. And while components such as free movement of goods and people are desirable, they mean that people only move to more developed countries at the expense of less developed ones. There is a risk that countries that are not economically strong enough to meet citizens needs will lose out. And receiving countries will feel threatened just as we see xenophobic tendencies in South Africa today.

iv. Commodities can generate enormous wealth, but it has to be redistributed equitably and efficiently. The state must play a critical role in the redistributive exercise.

v. There is a tendency in Africa to welcome external investments, but not investments from within Africa.

vi. Even if we have the best treaties and conventions, infrastructure is still not connected. The parlous state of Africa’s banking systems is but one example of this reality.

vii. A developmental approach to integration is more favorable in Africa than a market-driven one.

viii. The private sector and non-state actors can play critical in the integration agenda.

**Working Groups**

Discussion of economic costs continued with participants dividing into smaller working groups to reflect on three broad themes:

- Economic integration, growth, and development;
- The private sector, civil society, and developmental economic integration; and
- Financing economic integration, growth, and development.

*Economic integration, growth and development*

Participants observed that in most discussions there is a tendency to make assumptions, presuming, for example, that there will be collaboration and sharing of resources. Another common assumption is that states are democratic, reflect a social justice perspective, and reflect the interests of their populations. These assumptions need to be problematized, participants argued. In this regard, participants underscored the need to see resource endowments as they are, rather than what they should be.

Several speakers asserted that the current integration strategy reflects national liberal policies that are then taken to the regional and pan-African levels. They cautioned that national problems should not be replicated at the regional level.

A related observation noted that, until recently, emphasis had been placed on goods and capital, but not on people. Without human capital, economic development will not be achieved. And improving the infrastructure is critical in Africa. Also important is improving access to education and productive employment.

Participants argued for people-centered development, and proposed that studies be conducted to look at growth assumptions that underlie today’s development policies. There is a need to move beyond the market-state division to a people-centered process. Participants also urged Africa’s policy makers to move away from the usual structural adjustment programs and aid models that maintain the imbalance between imports and exports.
The private sector, civil society, and integration

Participants felt that the current continental agenda posits the market as an end. And because markets are not redistributive, the state needs to intervene in directing policy and making sure that economic integration improves people’s welfare. Although economic integration is a catalyst for economic growth, and although it improves production and facilitates nascent industrialization processes, there must be an implicit understanding that the processes lead to social dividends, especially for the poorest of the poor, in a manner that states acting alone cannot provide. The macroeconomic context should also be sensitive to local needs.

There was also a strong view that the state should not be over-emphasized at the expense of the people. In any developmental trajectory, there is a need to establish ways and mechanisms that enable the active participation of people and listen to their voices. In many African countries, the post-independence era demobilized civil societies, and governments have gone about weakening the remaining associations and formations of civil society.

Financing economic integration, growth and development

Participants noted that the CFA zone in West Africa is backed by the French government and the Euro. As a result, countries within this zone are experiencing hardships caused by the strong Euro, particularly when it comes to exports. And in Francophone Africa, bank policies do not favor local economies; rather, they support projects that skew import-export trade relations with Europe.

While participants did not come out against the private sector, they insisted on the need to find ways for it to benefit the integration process. They called for a regulatory framework to ensure that the private sector and international companies are supportive of development in Africa. Participants proposed that countries could float bonds to help finance integration efforts. However, they noted that most African states do not have the bond rating to be able to raise money on the market. Another suggestion was that of joint ventures. Participants again lamented that most entrepreneurs are not thinking about joint ventures across regions, for example in processing and production. Railways and power plants are among many types of infrastructure that can be developed jointly. The African Development Bank could be an important financing source for integration. The informal sector could also generate a considerable amount of resources for integration. Nevertheless, participants expressed concern about the challenge of formalizing the informal sector without destroying its values and tenets.

Sociocultural Costs of Non-Integration

Another plenary session focused on the sociocultural dimensions of the costs of non-integration. One paper looked at gender dimensions of the analysis and sought to contextualize the discussion within the policy framework of on-going processes of regional integration. Two other papers discussed in broad terms the cultural pillars of integration and the implications of not taking culture seriously in development projects.

The paper on the gender dimension of integration showed that Africa is moving toward both economic and political integration. While this move seems to have a universal character, it also means different things to different people, and hence its practice varies. There is clear evidence that African leaders have regional integration at the top of their agenda. However, current attempts at regional integration have been pursued at the expense of peoples and social policies. There is clear lack of implementation of regional treaties and protocols at both the sub-regional and national levels. In other words, the current integration approach is divorced
from the sociocultural and historical realities of different African contexts. This raises a question of governance: who participates in defining regional integration and who stands to benefit?

Regional integration should respond to questions of HIV/AIDS, poverty, human rights, and other social ills in Africa. That is, it should address the social dimensions of both economic and political union. The current approach is not a social developmental one, and hence downplays the social policy and equity dimensions, particularly gender equity. Furthermore, regional governance systems are still dominated by patriarchal modes. For too long in Africa, regional integration has been the business of governments alone and there has been very little participation by women. Does regional integration therefore help remove some of these constraints? Are women beneficiaries of integration?

A gender analysis of the costs of non-integration should also unearth some hidden costs, most of which are associated with issues of gender equity, women’s empowerment, and gender-based inequalities. If these hidden costs are not addressed, they are likely to hinder the implementation of integration. As the literature shows, women pay higher and different costs of integration or non-integration from men. In most cases integration carries a higher cost for women in terms of time burden and unpaid labor for social reproduction. Regional integration can easily accelerate the spread of HIV/AIDS by facilitating the mobility of populations, especially migrant workers and cross-border traders. There are also a number of costs that are associated with non-integration. If the current trend continues and trade is skewed toward Europe, the feminization of poverty is likely to increase as subsidized imports displace more women traders from existing market segments.

The other two papers emphasized the importance of culture as a basis for integration, arguing that issues of race, religion, sex, and culture allow for different perspectives on integration. The papers urged Africans to build on diversity and use it as an asset in integrating the continent. There was a call to protect and promote heritages as a way to revitalize and reposition African cultures. One of the papers remarked extensively on the work being done by the South African president regarding the revival of manuscripts in Timbuktu, Mali. This work was hailed as significant in the re-dynamism associated with African cultures. These manuscripts contain mechanisms to deal with conflict management, peace building, and issues around citizenship and identity. Speakers called for research projects on African traditional knowledge systems in Africa, creative industries and the interface between good governance and peace. They also suggested some activities that would enhance a cultural approach to integration. These include youth exchange programs, twinning of cities, development of African education and health industries, preserving African heritages, and copyrighting African products in all sectors.

**Working Groups**

Again dividing into small working groups, participants looked at how sociocultural issues might form part of the integration agenda, and sought to identify elements of a sociocultural agenda of action, existing norms, and standards to protect and promote sociocultural integration.

Participants felt strongly that language is a critical instrument and that Africans must have the opportunity to learn their own indigenous languages and other African languages from across the continent. It was unanimously agreed that colonial languages have been prioritized in Africa at the expense of indigenous languages. Speakers suggested putting in place advocacy mechanisms to ensure implementation of all political and policy declarations and norms around languages. Examining how school curricula can address the language issue was also deemed of critical importance. To promote the study of African literature, participants also
argued that books should be translated into African languages for easier consumption. These and other mechanisms would help address the question of African identities.

The pan-African media (radio and TV) also warrant support as a key factor in cultural integration. Participants agreed that joint TV productions should be encouraged as a way to bridge cultural barriers. It is worth noting that the African Union has advertised openings for a team leader and a technical expert for a study project on the establishment of a pan-African radio and television system.

Widespread concern over Africa losing her institutional memory can be mitigated by ensuring that the African story is told and marketed. Existing channels such as Nigeria’s ‘Nollywood’ video industry provide important opportunities. Participants encouraged research in this area, especially around the diversity of African cultures. They also felt that intergenerational dialogues could be as a useful means of undertaking participatory research. Participants proposed establishing a Pan-African Arts Council to promote Africa’s rich heritage. A good starting point, it was suggested, would be to make the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World History editions on Africa available in libraries.

**Conclusion**

The workshop concluded with a discussion of the Union Government proposal tabled at the AU Accra Summit. The different models and schools of thought were presented and debated intensely. Participants also emphasized the centrality of popular participation in regional integration processes, whether gradual, incremental, or totalizing. Whether it is the United States of Africa, the Union Government, or the Union of African States, the project will have no legitimacy if it is not based on consultation and the will of the people.

There was a realization that while many recommendations were made during the workshop, some areas needed further attention. TrustAfrica was encouraged to prioritize some of the following overlooked issues in subsequent workshops:

i. The military-security-integration nexus;
ii. Citizenship, identity, and integration;
iii. Leadership and integration;
iv. Empirical costs of non-integration;
v. Bridging the divide between research, policy, and advocacy;
vi. People-led integration versus state-led integration;
vii. Appropriation and re-appropriation of pan-Africanism from morbid agendas;
viii. Benchmarking progress in integration;
ix. Trade and integration in Africa;
x. African institutions of higher learning; and
xi. Regional integration and social diseases.

---

Participants

Mr. George Ngwane, Africaphonie, Cameroon  
Mr. Akere Muna, Pan-African Lawyers Union/Transparency International, Cameroon  
Amb. Ahmed Hagaag, African Society of Egypt, Egypt  
Dr. Boureima T. Diamitani, West Africa Museums Program, Senegal  
Prof. Amin Aloysius, Institute for Economic Development and Planning/UNECA, Senegal/France  
Ms. Lebohang Pheko, Gender and Trade Network in Africa, South Africa  
Mr. Mbuyamba Lupwishi, Observatory of Cultural Practices in Africa, Mozambique/DRC  
Dr. Garth Le Pere, Institute for Global Dialogue, South Africa  
Ms. Zo Randriamaro, UNIFEM, Senegal  
Mr. Yao Graham, Third World Network–Africa, Ghana  
M. Babacar Ndiaye, Member Africa Forum, Senegal  
Prof. Boubakar Barry, Université Cheikh Anta Diop, Senegal  
Mr. Adebayo Olukoshi, CODESRIA, Senegal  
Mr. Martial Akakpo, private sector, Togo  
Mr. Neville Gabriel, Southern Africa Trust, South Africa  
Dr. Thembinkosi Mhlongo, Southern Africa Trust, South Africa  
Ms. Moipore Ramalto, Nelson Mandela Children’s Fund, South Africa  
Mr. Ezra Mbogori, MWENGO, Zimbabwe  
Mr. Peter K.A. da Costa, Consultant, UK  
Ms. Aseghedech Ghirmazion, Consultant, Kenya  
Ms. Bisi Adeleye-Fayemi, African Women’s Development Fund, Ghana  
Dr. Chris Landsberg, Center for Policy Studies, South Africa  
Ms. Carrie Marias, UNESCO, Senegal  
Ms. Nicole Généreux, International Development Research Centre, Senegal

TrustAfrica board and staff

Dr. Gerry Salole, European Foundation Center, Belgium  
Ms. Akwe Amosu, Open Society Institute, USA  
Dr. Akwasi Aidoo, TrustAfrica, Senegal  
Mr. Fouad Abdelmoumni, Al Amana, Morocco  
Dr. Bahru Zewde, Forum for Social Studies, Ethiopia  
Ms. Chantal Uwimana, TrustAfrica, Program Director, Senegal  
Dr. Bheki Moyo, TrustAfrica, Senegal  
Ms. Jeanne Elone, TrustAfrica, Senegal  
Mr. Emmanuel Buringuriza, TrustAfrica, Senegal  
Ms. Adama Kouyate, TrustAfrica, Senegal