The Governance of Tertiary Education Institutions: Emerging Trends

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Why is institutional governance important?

The fundamental theme addressed by this conference, the role of tertiary education institutions in the knowledge economy, is echoed in most other countries today. For example a major thrust in European Union thinking is how university reform can contribute to the EU strategy of achieving a more internationally competitive economy. Its key publication in this area *The role of the universities in the Europe of Knowledge* (CEC 2003) argued that: “Given that they are situated at the crossroads of research, education and innovation universities in many respects hold the key to the knowledge economy and society” and it goes on to point out that universities are responsible for 80% of the fundamental research carried out in Europe, employ 34% of the active researchers and that the unemployment rate of their graduate output stood at only one third of that of people with lower qualifications. The Commission returned to the theme two years later in *Mobilising the brain power of Europe; enabling universities to make their full contribution to the Lisbon strategy* (CEC 2005) arguing that governments should take steps to encourage university reform including reform in their governance and leadership. The Lisbon strategy which was aimed at raising the level of investment in research to US levels (in industry as well as the universities) has stalled with the financial difficulties in the Euro zone but it is notable that all the major EU countries, including particularly the UK, have sought to protect research and university teaching in the budget cuts that have had to be imposed on public expenditure.

Identifying universities as key contributors to the economy emphasises the need for them to perform effectively and, for what the European Commission describes as “bottle necks”, to be removed. One of the most critical bottlenecks is governance, a word that in ‘Euro speak’ covers the role of the state as well as the machinery of institutional self governance. This has led to a significant recourse across Europe to what is termed (with some suspicion) the Anglo Saxon model, and to the US although Europe has no parallel to the US commitment to private universities. The most important characteristics of these two systems is the autonomy of the institutions in determining their own strategies and running their own affairs in comparison with the traditional continental European model where universities were closely integrated with the state, where there was no lay involvement in university governance, where academics were often employed on civil service terms and rectors (vice-chancellors) were elected by the faculty. Reforms have in fact, proceeded slowly and the European Universities Association (EUA) has recently created an autonomy scorecard, following very detailed research based on four aspect of governance: organisational autonomy, financial autonomy, staffing autonomy and academic autonomy, which puts the UK convincingly at the top of the table. (Esterman, Nokkala and Steinal 2011). (Ghana would not, I think, have been far behind). However, this degree of autonomy, especially in an era of austerity, puts an added onus on effective governance, leadership and management. If universities are so closely integrated with state bureaucracy to be virtually a department of the state, institutional governance is essentially in the hands of the appropriate Ministry, but when
universities have a high degree of financial and academic autonomy then there is the same requirement for good governance and good management and leadership structures as for a modern company, operating in the private sector. This means they have to have legally defined decision making structures to approve budgets, appoint and regulate staff, organize teaching and award degrees, provide for and support research and agree strategies to drive the institution forward. Any breakdown or weakness in these structures leads to a reduction of effectiveness in the conduct of the core business.

Some principles of university governance

Academic participation

The core business of universities is teaching and research, and their success in prosecuting them is what determines their reputation and, to a large extent, their financial support. Unlike companies their reputation does not depend on profitability, though they are certainly required to manage their finances effectively, stay solvent, invest in their infrastructure, aim to achieve surpluses to fund new ventures etc., and they do not have shareholders to whom they must pay dividends although they do have stakeholders, governments, students and civil society who they must satisfy; in addition, in financial matters, public institutions are accountable to governments for their expenditure just as other publicly funded organisations are. Unlike companies too they have a long tradition of the participation of their academic staff in the business of governance. As far back as 1213 the Magna Charter of the University of Paris indicated that the chancellor had to obtain the vote of the professors in matters connected with appointments for the teaching of theology and canon law and could not act on his own authority (Ruegg 1992). Since academic staff are the key knowledge resource, responsible for recruiting and teaching the students and for undertaking the research, they have a key role to play in strategy and internal decision-making. Similar arguments apply to knowledge workers in modern knowledge based companies. The senate represents the traditional vehicle through which the academic perspective on strategy and policy is expressed.

The role of lay governing bodies

While there is a great deal of commonality across international boundaries in the structures of university governance: governing bodies, senates, faculties and faculty boards, and academic departments, the balance of power and authority between these bodies, even where the legal definitions seem similar, can be remarkably different. This is because in spite of their autonomous character universities are affected by external environmental pressures and by their funding regimes. Changes in the balance of power and authority can occur sharply over time in a single higher education system. A good illustration of this can be found in the changes in the role of governing bodies in the UK. Governing bodies were very powerful in policy determination in the UK universities’ early days both because they were in a very real sense the universities’ founders and because universities attracted very little state funding. However, from 1945, when the state in effect took over the funding of universities through the University Grants Committee, senates became very much more powerful at the expense of governing bodies, because funding was secure and awarded fundamentally on academic criteria. (Senior university figures even questioned why universities had governing bodies). However, when cuts were imposed on university budgets by the Thatcher Government in 1980-81, a powerful committee, the Jarratt Committee on Efficiency Studies in Universities (set up as part of a scrutiny of cost effectiveness across government departments) called for university governing bodies to “assert” themselves and encouraged the view that it was no bad thing if there should be ‘tensions’ between governing bodies, as the guardians of the institutions’ financial stability and senates as protectors of academic departmental interests (Jarratt 1985). The Committee went on to recommend that the vice-chancellor should be regarded
not just as the chief academic and administrative officer but as the chief executive of the university. At one level this was purely a matter of semantics but it took on greater force when the Government began to draw analogies between the reforms in corporate governance in companies stimulated by the Cadbury Report (Cadbury 1992) and the need for university governing bodies to act more like company boards. This was enacted in legislative form in 1992 when the polytechnics became universities in a new constitutional form, the Higher Education Corporation (HEC). The traditional bicameral structure of a university council and senate, both exercising powers prescribed in university statutes, was abandoned for these institutions their academic boards being stripped of policy making functions except in academic areas, very narrowly defined, and questions of academic strategy being transferred wholesale to governing bodies.

Since then considerable efforts have been made through an organisation of governing body chairs, the Committee of University Chairmen (CUC), to strengthen the procedural operation of governing bodies in order to exercise their powers more effectively. This has in general strengthened the role of governing bodies although the continual incidence of governance breakdowns in post-1992 universities suggests that running UK universities, as if they were companies, through governing bodies has been much less effective than was hoped. (At the same time the collapse of the banking industry in the UK, which had high profile (and well remunerated) boards of directors, has also raised serious questions about the effectiveness of corporate governance in the private sector). It remains the case that the principle of involving a significant lay element in university governance is deeply embedded in the UK (and in the US) system both to ensure the public has a voice and to introduce an external ‘business’ sense into the running of university affairs.

Accountability and governance

A significant difference between public universities and public companies is the requirements for their accountability. In both the US and the UK a great deal of attention since the early 1990s has been directed to refining the way public companies are made fully accountable to their shareholders. In the US this has been encapsulated in the wake of the Enron collapse in the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation while in the UK, which has followed a more consultative route, it has resulted in the establishment of a Combined Code of Corporate Governance to which companies must sign up to join the Stock Exchange. The Code is reinforced by the Smith Guidance on Audit and the Turnbull Guidance on Risk and internal controls (Shattock 2006). This interest in corporate governance has been extended by analogy to the universities which have themselves, through the CUC, adopted a Code of Governance which was intended when drafted to serve a similar function to the Combined Code. In itself this is less significant, because the Code does not override university statutes, than the fact that in a mass higher education system accountability for financial management and for academic performance has become a much more important issue for the state; this has tended to further reinforce the position of governing bodies. Thus in the UK, the National Audit Office, as part of its review of a university’s internal financial controls, checks whether it is compliant with the CUC Code of Governance. A governing body is required to sign that it accepts the terms of a Financial Memorandum drawn up by the Funding Council which commits it to guarantee that the institution “has a sound system of internal financial management control”, that it will ensure that it remains solvent, that approval will be sought for any borrowing above 4% of turnover and that the governing body will inform the Funding Council if for any reason the requirements of the Memorandum are not being met (HEFCE 2010). It also requires governing bodies to approve formal strategic plans, financial plans and estates and buildings strategies, thus ensuring to the Funding Council that such plans have been appropriately prepared and implemented. Failure to adhere to the conditions laid down by the Memorandum may lead to the chair of council, as well as the vice-chancellor (who is designated as the principal accounting officer) bring required to appear before the Public Accounts Committee of Parliament.
In the US, where higher education is devolved to the states, accountability to the state legislation and the right of intervention by the state auditor, is often even more onerous. What these accountability provisions do is to lay heavy responsibilities on lay members of governing bodies so much so that it is sometimes not easy to recruit knowledgeable and effective professionals to sit on such bodies. By the same token, however, they have reinforced the role of the governing body in the affairs of the institution and strongly emphasised the principle that there is a need to have machinery by which publicly funded universities can satisfy public principles of accountability while guaranteeing their autonomy.

The role of executive leadership and management

The principles surrounding executive leadership and management and their relationship with governance vary considerably between the US, the European and the Anglo Saxon models. In the US from the earliest days a presidential system was adopted with a university president being answerable only to a lay board of regents and serving, without tenure, entirely at the board’s discretion. All executive action is carried out in the name of the president and executive staff, from vice presidents downwards, are answerable solely to him/her. While *de jure* this seems to offer a very efficient system in practice the president is vulnerable to dissatisfaction in the academic community and within the board and without tenure can be forced from office by a simple resolution of the regents. (The last President of Harvard resigned when a single School of the University passed a vote of no confidence in him). In the traditional European university the rector was elected from within the institution for a limited term but since the administration was provided by the state the post was almost entirely focused on ceremonial and on academic issues. Reforms have strengthened the rectors’ powers over management especially where budgets have been devolved from Ministries to institutions but only a few countries have moved to a system of appointing rectors from an external field. In the UK practice has always been to appoint rather than elect vice chancellors, and usually to appoint them from outside the university. In the pre-1992 universities the appointment is in practice made by a joint council and senate committee chaired by the chair of council while in the post-1992 the appointment is made by the governing body alone.

The Jarratt redefinition of the vice chancellor’s role as chief executive rather than chief academic and administrative officer took some time to be realized in the pre-1992 universities but was made formally explicit in the post-1992. This distinction was reflected in the executive management of the institutions in which the role of the registrar as secretary of council and head of the administration, whose position was protected in the statutes, was rarely paralleled in the post-1992 universities which opted for a senior management team reporting to the chief executive. The most senior members of this team would carry the title of pro vice chancellor. As a general principle the executive management of the pre-1992 universities remained subject to academic control through the senate while in the post-1992 universities it was very clearly only accountable to the governing body. The implicit dangers in this latter model can be seen in the number of governance breakdowns that have occurred in institutions working under HEC constitutions where headstrong chief executives have not been adequately controlled by their governing bodies or where executive management teams as a group have driven their universities in directions which were inherently unwise. The conclusions reached in a report on an extreme example of this at the London Metropolitan University where “a highly centralized and dictatorial executive led by the vice chancellor … was incapable of listening to what was going on…..discouraged or ignored criticism and made decisions without consultation…[which had] a dispiriting and demotivating effect on staff” (Melville 2009) illustrates the issue only too clearly.

The position of the executive in UK universities has been reinforced by the far reaching changes in
national funding policies whereby the introduction of tuition fees, initially as an additional £3000 ‘top up’ of normal recurrent funding in 2006, followed by a complete substitution of tuition fees of up to £9000 for recurrent funding from the state from 2012, appear to have greatly strengthened the power of the university executive both at the expense of governing bodies and of senates/academic boards. University executive groups, effectively Senior Management Teams (SMTs) in many universities, chaired by the vice-chancellor, have become dominant within institutions rather as lay governing bodies, like boards of directors in the banking industry, have found it impossible to maintain control or give direction in a very fast moving environment. Senates, even in the pre-1992 universities, where the tradition of academic participation has always been strong, have also found it difficult to keep up with the amount of technical detail involved in the running of modern universities and have de facto if not de jure devolved a significant amount of decision making to their universities’ executive management teams.

Reconciling the basic principles of university governance

What the above account of developments in the UK shows is the difficulty of reconciling the principle of the close involvement of the academic community in university governance with the pressures to create an effective governing body and the need to maintain an academic oversight of strategy when the external funding environment pushes institutions to depend more and more on small, expert, executive groups which can take decisions quickly. One solution, which has gained some support, is to reduce the size of governing bodies to that of a normal commercial board so that they can meet more frequently and exercise more control over the executive but this risks the contrary danger of the development of too close an identity between the governing body and the executive so that the executive is no longer monitored impartially by the governing body. It raises the question too of whether any group of lay governors could be induced to give up the time required for such a task without some form of remuneration. A diagrammatic presentation of the tensions in university governance in the UK might look something like this:

![Diagram](Shattock2012)

International trends in modern university governance

Looking across a broad range of country development four current trends can be discerned in the governance of university level institutions. The first is a devolution of institutional governance and management powers from central government to the institutions themselves. This is most apparent in continental Europe where universities were traditionally administered from a central government department and university staff held appointments on civil service terms. (In Spain an alternative decision was taken in the 1980s to devolve central governance and management of the university system to provincial governments but university staff continued to be appointed on central government civil service terms. This decision managed to achieve the worst of both worlds: it continued to deprive the universities of the ability to take autonomous decisions and it vitiates any capacity within central Government to create a unified higher education policy.) A good non-European example is offered by Japan which, prior to the Koizumi reforms, administered the public universities almost entirely centrally so that, for example, universities did not have individual sets
of financial accounts (because they did not have powers of financial self management) and the registrar was a civil servant seconded for a limited term from the Ministry and then transferred to another institution. The presidents of the universities were elected from within the academic staff for fixed terms. Under the reforms in 2004, however, financial management and individual staff contracts were devolved to the universities themselves and governing bodies and executive boards were created to run the institutions. The presidents, however, remained elected by the academic community. Critics argue that the reluctance of the Ministry to embrace these reforms wholeheartedly, which were dictated personally by the Prime Minister, has resulted in much less autonomy being conferred on institutions than was originally intended. By comparison the recent Sarkozy reforms in France, though restricted initially to a limited number of leading institutions, seems to have produced radical change from a previously entirely centralised position.

The second trend, which is closely associated with the devolution of financial decision making to institutions is the introduction of lay governing bodies. In Europe there is no doubt that this has been heavily influenced by the Anglo Saxon model although cultural and other factors have produced considerable variability in implementation. Thus in Northern Europe, Scandinavia and the Netherlands, lay governing bodies have assumed roles very similar to those in the UK. In some other countries, France, Germany, Spain and Italy, for example, their introduction has been much less decisive and their powers much less clearly defined. In some cases their roles are only advisory because governments could not bring themselves to impose lay control over academic communities.

By comparison, in the US, where public higher education has under the Constitution always been devolved to state legislatures, governing boards have historically held unicameral powers over their institutions and, even in the most recent period of acute austerity (budget cuts of 20% were imposed by the state on the University of California), have maintained their independence in determining how economies were to be distributed within institutions and how such economies should be mitigated by increased tuition fees. A powerful, Washington based, Association of Governing Boards provides guidance on governance issues, training programmes for new governors and a lobbying arm to Congress. An important caveat, however, needs to be entered in respect to what might appear as the dominant role of the board of regents within US universities. While *de jure* the boards exercise unicameral powers, that is they have formal control over governance, strategy and academic affairs, *de facto* a network of academic committees controls the academic agenda and research intensive universities will invariably have a recognised academic body (e.g the Senate of the University of California), which may not necessarily appear in the statutes, which interfaces with the president and the regents. The term 'shared governance' is American in origin and denotes the partnership which, in US eyes, should ideally exist between the board and the academic community.

In the UK, as we have seen above, the position of governing bodies has been strengthened under pressure from Government, and particularly because of the need to ensure accountability. The National Committee of Inquiry into Higher Education (the Dearing Committee) which reported in 1997 argued strongly that governing body membership should not exceed 24, the figure that was laid down in the 1992 legislation for the polytechnics on assuming university status (NCIHE 1997), and this led over time to a reduction of the size of pre-1992 universities from around 40 to smaller bodies, though not always down to 24. This was achieved in part by removing the representation of local authority members and by concentrating more on the need to ensure that governing bodies could draw on an appropriate spread of professional expertise. For the most part these universities only reduced academic representation from their senates pro-rata retaining a one third academic membership in contrast to the post-1992 universities which are restricted to no more than two or three academic members.
A third trend is the increasing emphasis being placed on the leadership of institutions. This has always been apparent in US public universities although presidential power must be balanced against the political and other constraints referred to above. In the UK, one of the outcomes of the Dearing Report was the establishment of a government funded Leadership Foundation which has both funded research in leadership and runs a well regarded programme for senior university personnel from the alumni of which vice-chancellors tend to be appointed. (The Foundation also provides services to the CUC). One by product of the existence of the Leadership Foundation has been a legitimation of leadership at the vice-chancellor level and the creation of an accepted field from which new vice-chancellors might be expected to be drawn. Having said that leadership styles vary from the explicitly chief executive style in most post-1992 universities to a more nuanced style of academic and managerial leadership in the pre-1992. Similar variations can be found in other countries such as Australia, South Africa and New Zealand where, as in the UK, vice-chancellors are appointed not elected but are in general more unconstrained in their leadership style in the newer universities than in the older where a traditional model of academic participation in governance and management is more likely to survive.

An important constraint on vice-chancellorial power in the UK and in Australia is the establishment of a more explicit reporting function to the governing body and its chair; this is reinforced by the role of the chair in appraising the vice-chancellor’s performance and, by the governing body’s remuneration committee role in assessing and, as appropriate, rewarding success. (In Australia the chairs exercise of this role is particularly draconian with some chairs exercising a quasi executive role requiring formal office accommodation within the institution). In spite of these provisions, however, the most serious governance breakdowns in the UK can be attributed to headstrong vice-chancellors who have taken a dominant role in relation to their chairs and governing bodies, as well as to their academic communities. In spite of their legal powers, governing bodies have not always proved to be an effective check on the executive and it is generally the academic community which has blown the whistle on vice chancellorial or corporate misconduct. Counter intuitively, some of the most dominant heads of institutions can be found in university systems where heads are elected where substantial budgetary decision making has been devolved from central government but where governing bodies are relatively poorly developed. Unless a fixed term appointment is prescribed in the university’s constitution the danger is that the electoral system can generate a permanent majority for a given candidate.

A fourth and final trend is the development of strong central management teams. In Europe these were first popularised in Clark’s book *Creating the Entrepreneurial University* (1998) which argued that one of the key organisational features of an entrepreneurial (or ‘self reliant’) university was the existence of ‘a strengthened steering core’. Such teams can take the form of a company-type SMT where all the members are essentially appointed for their managerial skills by the chief executive and hold full time managerial posts, or can be a committee of senior academics (some of whom may be elected from within the academic community) and senior professional administrators to comprise what in some universities is known as the executive board. In either case the composition may include deans. (A significant test of how ‘academic’ the business of such a group might be is whether the deans of devolved faculty structures are or are not considered part of the steering core). An important governance issue is whether this body is answerable to the senate as well as to the governing body or only to the governing body; the former case would be usual where the membership is primarily academic, the latter when it is primarily managerial.

One of the features of developments in the UK and Australia is the increase in pro-vice-chancellor positions. Again a distinction must be drawn between full time and permanent pro-vice chancellor posts and posts where their holders are expected to continue part-time in teaching and research. Increasingly these posts are filled by public advertisement rather than through internal promotion.
From two or three such posts in medium to large sized UK universities before 2000 the number of what Deem aptly calls ‘manager academics’ (Deem et al 2007) to distinguish them from professional managers has increased to six or seven. Increasingly too, at least in the UK pre-1992 universities, and as a consequence of expansion and increased management complexity, there seems to be a move towards appointing the registrar as chief operating officer thus explicitly devolving the running of the administration to a manager while locating strategy and particularly academic strategy in a strong academic team.

While forms of organisation and titles of posts may differ the key trend is for institutions to be managed by a core group, recognised within the institution as some kind of executive team, which steers the university and is responsible for week by week policy making. Such a generic organisational form seems to be as common in continental European universities as in those that trace their governance and leadership models to the Anglo Saxon tradition and is a reflection of the growing size of institutions, the increasingly complex regulatory regimes imposed by governments and the need to be able to respond quickly to events outside or inside the university.

Academic governance in the UK

There are, of course, dangers in the creation of strong central steering teams in that they can become isolated from academic opinion and seen by the academic community as a kind of junta not subject to academic process or open to what management text books call ‘constructive confrontation’. A cohesive executive team may also dominate a governing body which by designation, is essentially non-executive in character and which only meets occasionally during the academic year. It is essential therefore that this central team or executive board is transparent in its decision making, consults academic committees and is properly concerned not to ignore or supplant the role of the governing body which must be the final decision making body in areas of main strategic or financial importance.

The tendency to concentrate decision making within SMTs or executive boards has had the effect of undermining the role of senates. Unlike governing bodies where CUC and Government pressure has been to reduce their membership and make them more efficient, senates until recently have had no incentive to reform their procedures and membership. A consequence is that in many universities they have become too large to be effective and meeting once or twice a term they have no chance of keeping up with an expert group or executive board which meets weekly and which is driven by pressures which require speedy decisions. One result is that absentee levels have risen and in many universities senates find themselves without the expertise or background to comment effectively on major strategic issues or on policy issues that involve significant risk. If senates are to play a significant role in the development of strategy and mount a constructive critique of the activities of the SMTs or executive boards it is incumbent on them to reform themselves by reducing membership numbers and adopting more business-like methods of decision making.

One further reason for the partial sidelining of the senate is the propensity (one might also suggest mania) in UK universities for restructuring organisation at the faculty level. Such reorganisations have been driven by a wish to devolve resource allocation away from an overloaded centre, to respond more effectively to competition in the national Research Assessment Exercise or, it must be said, simply because other universities are doing it. Two investigations by Hogan (2005 and 2012) emphasise the point. In the first, he shows that between 1993 and 2002 about 74% of 81 universities studied may have restructured their faculties, sometimes merging them, sometimes merging departments into schools and sometimes eliminating faculties altogether and leaving schools, which have been formed by merging departments, reporting direct to the centre. The majority of restructuring in this period took place in the post-1992 universities but in a second study.
based on the years 2002-2007, when the pace of restructuring seems to have accelerated, of the 65% of the 72 universities studied about half were from the pre-1992 universities.

The dominant trend amongst the larger universities appears to be towards a reorganisation of faculties into three or four colleges and up to 30 schools in order to achieve a smaller number of larger units. The designation of a college is accompanied by the appointment of a college head, a kind of super dean, who is often also designated a pro-vice-chancellor and a member of the SMT/executive board. The college head will normally have line manager responsibility for the school heads within the college and will have resource allocation powers from a devolved budget. College administration will normally be headed by a senior administrator responsible to the college head but will also have a ‘dotted line’ responsibility to the Registrar.

It is difficult to say in the light of the speed with which these reorganisations have taken place whether the system has moved permanently to a new model or whether this is just a stage on a continuous path of change. There are also signs in some universities that the fear of future austerity has led some universities to withdraw or greatly reduce the level of budgetary devolution to colleges which was a *raison d’ etre* for the original restructuring. There is also criticism that such reorganisations have increased administrative costs at the expense of academic costs and that the centre - department relationship provided a more economical model than centre - college - school. Two things are clear, however, the first is that institutions have put enormous energy into finding new patterns of organisation that they believe will provide a more effective governance and management structure for universities which have increased their size by about 30% in the last decade alone and the second is that, perhaps inevitably, the involvement of individual academic staff in governance issues has been pushed further to the periphery.

Even within one country, the UK, there is no consensus, in a rapidly changing environment for universities, of what might be an ideal model of university governance. The following diagram might, however, capture some essential features of the Anglo Saxon model best suited to modern conditions and to the effective conduct of university business:

(Shattock 2012)
Governance and management in Ghana’s tertiary education institutions

The conclusions that I hope can be drawn from the above is that university governance structures are not fixed and that even within the same formal constitutions there may be sharp changes in balance between particular bodies or elements depending on external pressures, changes in funding methodologies or simply the national political scene. Equally I hope it is evident that there is no clear international model. What is often described as the Anglo Saxon model is making headway in Europe but is unlikely to be adopted wholesale because in so many ways it conflicts with cultural norms which have a deep historical resonance. The US model is widely followed in the Far East - Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan - and is also influential in China, but has no purchase in India and could not be described as universal in application. In my view Ghana would be well advised to adopt and reform the governance system it has rather than embark on a wholly new approach. I offer the following points for consideration:

1. Every tertiary education institution should have a strong and effective governing body comprising somewhere between 20 and 25 members. The membership should include a significant minority (around one third) nominated by the senate/academic board of the institution. The ‘lay’ members should be drawn from external bodies representative of the economic, business, social and cultural life of the country.

2. The chairs of the governing bodies should be encouraged to form a committee of chairs along the lines of the CUC in the UK and the AGB in the US (and a similar body in Australia) which would concern itself inter alia with sharing governance issues, offering governor development programmes for governing body members and considering how best to conduct effectiveness reviews and performance reviews. (There might be advantage in opening communication with the UK Leadership Foundation which is closely in touch with professionals - normally former registrars - who serve as external members of UK university governing body effectiveness reviews). A first step might be to consider issuing a Guide to Governance along the lines followed by Australia, England and Wales, Scotland and the Republic of Ireland.

3. A key role for the governing body is to ensure that the institution’s financial systems are effective, that risks are appropriately taken into account and that the institution is solvent. On all these and related points it is accountable both to Government and to society. The device of a Financial Memorandum which forms a contract between the institution and the National Council for Tertiary Education in regard to financial and other accountabilities might be useful in defining those accountabilities. As part of this process the National Council should receive copies of institutions’ strategic and financial plans at regular intervals.

4. Recognising the role of the vice-chancellor/principal as head of the institution and its chief executive, institutions should be encouraged to establish an executive group (which might be called an executive board) comprising pro-vice-chancellors, deans and senior administrators to assist the vice-chancellor/principal in the management of the institution. This body should be required to report or recommend (as appropriate) to the senate/academic board as well as to the governing body and to communicate its actions widely round the institution.

5. Institutions should be encouraged to initiate reviews as to the effectiveness of their senates/academic boards to ensure that they are able to match the requirements of their constitutions and take appropriate responsibility for the academic work of the institution.
The reviews should take account of the size of the membership (not more than 30-35 including student members), the ability to ensure the quality of courses and the effectiveness of the academic regulations.

6. Institutions should be encouraged to review their arrangements to devolve decision-making, including financial decision making, to deans, directors of centres etc. and heads of departments in the light of the present and future expansion of the institutions themselves. The reviews should ask whether the current structure of faculties etc. meets the expected needs of the institution in the future and whether the support structure is adequate to the responsibilities involved.

7. Students. In any situation where expansion in numbers is in danger of swamping facilities and teaching arrangements it is important to maintain a dialogue with the student body to ensure that pinch points are recognised and that complaints, where possible, can be addressed. In the UK it would be normal to have departmental staff:student liaison committees to discuss issues regarding courses and at national level there is a questionnaire administered jointly with the National Union of Students addressed to all third year students seeking their comments on teaching, feedback etc. (A similar exercise is carried out in Australia). The results are widely publicised, and inevitably converted into league tables, but are effective in ensuring that institutions are aware of difficulties in individual departments. Every Ghanaian tertiary institution needs to consider what machinery is most effective, in addition to membership of the senate/academic board, to consult students and provide a channel of communication by which institution-wide complaints can be heard.

8. Organisational culture. A critical factor in institutional success is the creation and preservation of a positive organisational culture. Good governance makes a key contribution through transparency in decision making, good working relationships through joint committees between the governing body and the senate/academic board, good communication between the central management and the academic community, and the cultivation of a sense that staff are able to participate, even if remotely, in determining institutional policy and in strategic decision making. It is always important for central decision makers to remember that the core business of a university is teaching and research, and that it is upon this that the university’s reputation ultimately rests. If those responsible for teaching and research feel excluded from the governance of the institution organisational culture will suffer.

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